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Abstract
Wildlife in Zimbabwe's communal lands, unlike livestock or agricultural production, is based 
on ecological units that do not necessarily conform to the administrative boundaries o f ward 
or district. In the communal areas of Zimbabwe, livestock and arable based production and 
income are privatised to the household even though they are under communal tenure. 
Consequently, this control of benefits influences the degree of tolerance of transactional and 
opportunity costs households are willing to bear in the production process1. With such 
motivational dynamics at play, the fugitive nature of wildlife resources and communal land 
tenure, how then should a wildlife producer community be defined?
This.article analyses distribution of wildlife revenues in the Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho 
Districts' CAMPFIRE (Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous 
Resources) programmes. The issue is important for programmes that focus on wildlife as an 
alternative land use option and source of income for those communities living with, or close 
to, the natural resource. The article points out that, in these districts, the distribution of 
benefits from wildlife use is undertaken on a community basis which is geographically 
defined. However, this procedure neglects those particular groups who bear the cost of 
wildlife management. Consequently, the viability of wildlife management in the communal 
lands is negatively affected.
1 Owners of land held under private tenure have readily taken up wildlife as a land use option 
because they are the deemed producers and therefore the sole appropriated of wildlife benefits.
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Introduction
Community is a term that suggests several images. As a result there is no consensus on the 
definition of the term (Hillery, 1955, Cousins, 1993). Community may be used as a unitary 
term for geographical units or sets of units, for example village, ward or district: In such 
cases, spatial boundaries are used to determine the extent of the community. In some eases, 
community is used as an analytical category, such as a hunting community, San community 
or wildlife producer comjnunity. Here the characteristics of the group define what the 
community is. With such different meanings, how do we define a wildlife producer 
community in a communal area setting? To answer this question, we need to analyse the 
'community1 in terms of wards and villages.
Communal areas are divided up into administrative units of villages. Six or seven villages will 
make a ward. These units have clear boundaries determined on the basis of land area or 
household number. The people in these units may be referred to as communities. This is 
regardless of other characteristics like resource endowment among the inhabitants, self 
sufficiency or effects of wildlife. In other words the term community as used here to refer to 
villages and wards, is not analogous to Redfield's (1955) ideal type of the 'little community1. 
Having noted what community means when one refers to a village or ward, let us look at 
wildlife as a natural resource in the communal areas.
It has already been mentioned that wildlife is a fugitive resource. Wildlife can be costly in the 
communal areas. These wildlife costs emerge in the form of damage to crops and livestock 
(Hawkes, 1992). In Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho the greatest problem animals are 
elephant, and hyaena. Hyaenas are nocturnal predators of cattle, donkeys and goats. 
Elephants destroy large quantities of crops in the fields. They are formidable problem 
animals. These costs are not borne on a ward wide or village wide basis but as communities, 
i.e. as analytical categories, in villages and wards. The cost of living with, or close to, wildlife 
differ for households living in a spatially defined community, for example ward. In this paper, 
I give examples of two communities identified on the basis of the costs they have suffered 
from wildlife. Opportunity costs arose where users were forced to forgo the use of their 
range in order for it to be used by wildlife. This range can be used for inter alia houseland, 
arables, pastures, hunting or gathering. Those foregoing the use of such range are 
communities, but do not necessarily conform with the spatial boundaries o f village or ward.
While wildlife can be a cost, it can also be a benefit. In those areas where CAMPFIRE is 
being implemented, benefits from wildlife are largely in monetary form2. These include the
2 For a discussion of other benefits see Nabane et al (1996) pp 5
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revenues obtained from tourist activities like safari hunting or photographic safaris. The 
revenues can be distributed to households or used to finance community projects. However, 
which definition o f ‘community' is considered when these benefits are distributed; and how 
effective is the current definition of'producer community' in motivating communities to bear 
the costs o f wildlife referred to in the above paragraph?
In this article the problems of defining a wildlife producer community are discussed. It is 
concluded that there is need for CAMPFIRE to go further and differentiate the villages and 
wards in terms o f their relationship to wildlife. The ward may be a convenient administrative 
unit for other purposes. However, it does not seem to be very relevant when one is dealing 
with CAMPFIRE and wildlife as a resource. In other words, the term community does not 
imply ward when one is dealing with wildlife issues in Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho. It is 
by paying attention to those who actually pay the costs o f living with the wildlife that 
CAMPFIRE can effectively establish a link between cost and benefit. By so doing those who 
bear the cost appreciate the value o f wildlife as a source o f income equal to or better than 
arable agriculture or livestock production. A brief discussion o f the goals o f CAMPFIRE 
and the study area is put forward in the following section.
Background to CAMPFIRE and the study area
CAMPFIRE is a community based natural resource management programme. It seeks to 
demonstrate that, with appropriate incentives, wildlife is a viable and alternative land use 
option in ecologically marginal areas. In communal areas those living with or close to the 
wildlife, and thus paying the costs of doing so, will benefit from wildlife use (DNPWLM, 
1984,1990). These are the "relevant populations" that are the target of CAMPFIRE.
' The "relevant populations" are those who live within the micro-environments 
which sustain the natural resources concerned, who pay the price fo r  their 
sustained maintenance, who m ust reap the benefits o f this investment, and who at 
the sm allest viable operational level, have the capacity to manage the resources. 
(This) reflects . . . a  recognition o f the dynamics o f economic motivation which 
necessarily impose themselves on rural populations under subsistence conditions 
and seeks to restore a  localised custodianship which can give scope to the fusion  
o f ecological responsibility and community interest which characterises traditional 
African cultures.' (Murphree, 1990 p.3)
Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho districts are in South Western Zimbabwe. Both districts 
share their western boundaries with the Hwange National Park. The districts are separated by 
the Nata River. Elephants and other wildlife move between the two districts and the Hwange 
National Park (Murphree, 1989: p.4). In 1990, at the inception o f the CAMPFIRE project in 
this area, these two districts ran a joint hunting programme and shared the revenues equally. 
In 1992 Tsholotsho Rural District Council felt that sharing revenues equally with 
Bulilimamangwe District did not reflect its greater endowment in wildlife resources. It 
argued that it had more wildlife resources, a consequence of superior range management on 
their side. For example, the canal system supplying water to the wildlife area from Graiya 
dam. Therefore, sharing the revenues equally did not reflect the difference of effort invested.
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As a result Tsholotsho seceded from the joint venture to begin its own separate safari 
operations in the southern part of the district. Tsholotsho's withdrawal from the joint venture 
is significant for the argument being made in this article. Wildlife production is not uniform 
across the environments suggested by physical boundaries. Those who perceive that they are 
contributing more to wildlife production expect to be rewarded accordingly. This argument is 
central when we deal with the populations within the micro environments mentioned earlier. 
Hus will be demonstrated in the rest of the article.
Seven wards have been selected for the CAMPFIRE programme in Bulilimamangwe. These 
are Makhulela, Ndolwane, Huwana, Gala, Bambadzi, Hingwe and Madlambudzi. The wards 
were selected on the basis o f their claims to dry season grazing in the area designated for 
wildlife3. These wards are dominated by the Ndebele and Kalanga ethnic groups who are 
agro-astoralists (Madzudzo and Dzingirai, 1995 pp.28-35). Conspicuously absent in this 
selection was the mention of the minority San Bakwa group as major users of the area.
Prior to the introduction o f the CAMPFIRE programme in Bulilimamangwe in 1990, an 
ethnic group, the San, led a nomadic lifestyle with hunting and gathering in the proposed 
wildlife project area. To facilitate safari hunting, a major component of CAMPFIRE, the 
Rural District Council requested the San to keep out of the project area. They were told by 
council and project officials that the area where they had been living was to be a CAMPFIRE 
area. Also, they were prohibited from hunting wildlife. A San settlement was set up at the 
fringes of Makhulela ward. The San were encouraged to adopt a sedentary life style based on 
agriculture. They, however, lacked even the basic pre-requisites for one to lead a life based 
on agriculture; for example, draught power, ploughs or seed. A non-governmental 
organisation, Redd Bama, assisted the San to begin a life based on agriculture by providing 
them with access to a tractor. San fields were away from the area where the rest of the fields 
were in the village (Madzudzo and Dzingirai, 28-35). Notably these fields were closest to 
areas of wildlife incursion.
In Tsholotsho, the lowest unit of settlement is a line. A line is made up o f a number of 
households. There is no fixed number of households that make a line neither is there a fixed 
number of lines to make a village. Availability of resources like grazing, arables, and water 
determine the limit to the number of households belonging to a line. Each line has its sabuku 
(kraalhead). Six villages make up a ward. Each village has a village development committee 
and each ward, a ward development committee (wadco). The chairman of the wadco is the 
councillor. Eight wards were selected for the CAMPFIRE programme in Tsholotsho on the 
basis of perceived wildlife presence and activity. Four of these wards make the Northern 
section, namely wards 2, 3, 4 and later 9. The Southern section includes wards 1, 7, 8, and 
10. This southern section was the one previously run as a joint project with Bulilimamangwe, 
for the CAMPFIRE project.
An electric fence is being erected on most sections parallel to the Hwange National Park foot 
and mouth disease boundary fence, as part of the CAMPFIRE programme in Tsholotsho. 
The fence will create a buffer zone between the communal area and the Hwange National
3 However, our research on grazing has demonstrated that only a few large herd owning 
households in far less than the mentioned wards normally use the area (See; Madzudzo and 
Hawkes, 1996)
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Park to facilitate safari hunting operations. It is also expected that the fence will protect 
livestock and arables from wildlife predation and crop damage (see map).
Wildlife benefit distribution in Bulilimamangwe
Revenue from wildlife, mainly from safari hunting, is distributed as follows: 15% to council 
as a levy, 35% to council for project management and 50% to CAMPFIRE wards. Each 
ward receives an equal amount o f money from the 50% of the revenues allocated to the 
beneficiary wards. Ward committees decide on how the revenues are going to be used. The 
revenues from wildlife are not large enough to be shared as household dividends among the 
households. The highest amount the wards received was Z$20 000 in 1991. Each ward has 
at least 800 households. Therefore this defeats the possibility of household dividends. Instead 
the money has been used for 'community* projects. Below a brief account is given of how 
Makhulela ward used its revenues in 1993.
In Makhulela ward, the councillor bought fences for each village. After erection, the fencing 
in one village was stolen. A wildlife committee member was asked why people were 
destroying a fence that would help them protect their crops. In reply he said that, ’Youhiow  
that govem m entproperty is always stolen.' He did not see the differences between other 
government and CAMPFIRE projects. The fact that the revenues from the use of wildlife are 
distributed to every ward regardless of cost, has weakened the link between wildlife 
management and benefit in this ward. The same applies to other wards in the district.'
When Makhulela village received its allocation of fencing, this was used to fence those fields 
of the Kalanga and Ndebele. No fence was used to protect the fields of the San. The San, in 
covert protest, refused to participate in the erection o f the fence as requested by the 
councillor. They argued that the fence was not going to benefit them. The councillor felt that 
the San were not co-operating in community projects. He said that this was a symptom of a 
dependence syndrome among the San. They were used to receiving handouts from donors 
without putting any effort.
Later, the San kraalhead approached the councillor demanding a share of the ward revenues 
for his people. They needed the money to purchase some donkeys for draught power. This 
was opposed by the councillor and other Kalanga and Ndebele present at the meeting. They 
argued that the revenues were for the ward that included the San. It was said that the San 
should come to meetings and lobby for projects for their area. The San rejected this saying 
that they were not given opportunities to air their views at meetings. They further alleged 
that when a San stood up to talk at a meeting people would oppose any ideas he or she were 
trying to put across. Consequently, all projects selected did not benefit the San. They further 
complained that there were no San members o f the wildlife committee because the people did 
not select them.
Although the San had given up their use o f the wildlife area for the sake o f CAMPFIRE, they 
were not getting the benefits of the project. Although the area had previously\been used by 
San households for their continued subsistence, interests of the village at large were now 
being considered to their disadvantage. As one respondent commented:
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'(In the past) The San were not serious about ploughing since there was 
abundant w ildlife fo r  meat. The meat would be exchanged fo r  grain from  
the Kalanga people. The San ewe not showing signs o f changing from  their 
oldwciys although hunting has been restricted They are beggars without the 
meat. Some try to carve stools but their lives are now worse them before'.
Distribution of wildlife benefits in Tsholotsho
It is my intention to show that, as in Bulilimamangwe, the distribution o f revenues from 
wildlife in Tsholotsho does not adequately consider who pays more for living with wildlife. 
Unlike in Bulilimamangwe, revenues are not uniformly distributed to the participating wards 
in Tsholotsho. The ward where an animal is shot is regarded as the ward which produced the 
animal. It therefore gets the a larger share of the wildlife revenue (see Table 1). However, 
although Tsholotsho district rewards each ward differently - on the basis o f who has 
produced the wildlife - this is not adequate. When the money gets to the ward there is no 
attempt to share the benefits in terms of incurred costs o f living with wildlife. This is because 
the benefits from wildlife are being consumed collectively at ward level. I show this by way 
o f a case study of the relocation of Lubanji line.
Table 1 Wildlife Revenues
Ward Revenues received in Revenues received in Revenues received in
1992 (Z$) 1994 (Z$) 1996 (Z$)
1 91250 (50)* 42179 (31) 124 750 (47)
2 48 750 (29) 4 375 ( 8) 22 500 (16)
3 85 631 (51) 39 375 (75) 70 755 (51)
4 32 500 (20) 4 375 ( 8 ) 22 500 (16)
7 56 667 (32) 42 934 (32) 93 096 (35)
8 16 666 ( 9) 24 679 (18) 24 000 ( 9 )
9 4 ( 0 ) 4 375 ( 8) 22 500 (16)
10 16 666 ( 9) 24 679 (18) 24 000 ( 9 )
Source: Adapted from Tsholotsho Rural District Council, CAMPFIRE Manager's Annual 
Reports, 1992,1994, and 1996.
* Numbers in parentheses are percentages of revenues received by the respective ward. The 
northern or southern wards are considered separately. Percentages do not always add to 100 
because of rounding error.
In Tsholotsho it has always been wards 1, 3 and 7 that earn the highest revenues. These 
wards share a common boundary with Hwange National Park (see map). Therefore, there is 
a greater amount o f wildlife movement into the wards from the national park. Consequently, 
most of the hunting operations in the area have taken place in these wards. Ward 2 is an 
interior ward in relation to the Hwange National Park boundary. In a desire to have a bigger 
place where the animals can move freely, and thus attract more hunting activity, the 4
4 Ward 9 only became a CAMPFIRE ward in 1993 after a stray elephant was shot in the area.
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councillor for the ward requested the diversion of the electric fence trace line to take up more 
land at the points it passes through the ward. In so doing this has necessitated relocating the 
people of Lubanji line who were now enclosed in the buffer area.
To the programme planners, Lubanji line would threaten the CAMPFIRE project because of 
human and livestock populations which would discourage the wildlife to reside in the area. 
Therefore, they had to be relocated. It is interesting to see how the residents o f Lubanji line 
viewed this relocation.
Individual cost versus ward benefit in the relocation of Lubanji Line
Lubanji line inhabitants in Zamazama village, Ward 2, were asked to move to Vusani line in 
the interior o f the ward to make way for the wildlife buffer area in Tsholotsho North area. 
Officials from the Rural District Council, Ward 2 Wildlife Committee, a non-governmental 
organisation (Zimbabwe Trust) and the ward councillor, approached the people of Lubanji in 
July, 1993 to inform them that their line had been enclosed in the proposed wildlife area. The 
inclusion of the line in the wildlife area meant that the area would be enclosed by the electric 
fence. At this time the clearing of the trace line for the electric fence was already in progress. 
It was pointed out that the people o f Lubanji line were-free to continue staying in the line. It 
was also pointed out that there would be increased wildlife presence in the area which would 
be a threat to the local inhabitants, their livestock and crops. Problem animal control would 
not be guaranteed. However, those who wished to be moved had to choose a place of their 
choice where a borehole, for domestic and livestock water supplies, would be sunk.
The residents o f Lubanji agreed to move out of the area. They made a request to the officials 
to be allowed to remain in Lubanji for the next cropping season as it was too late to clear 
new fields in the area o f their relocation. However, the people later went to the headman of 
the area, umlisa to question why, after independence, they were asked to vacate their area 
when they were living in a communal area where forced removals were not supposed to take 
place5. The headman indicated that he had no knowledge o f the relocation. Furthermore, he 
pointed out that headmen were no longer in control of settling people, as the role had been 
taken up by the councillors and the village development committees. The headman then 
referred the people from Lubanji to the chief nduna of the area, Muswigana. The chief also 
pointed out to the people that he was not aware of the relocation and that he had no powers 
over land and settlement in the area.
It is clear that the people o f Lubanji did not make a request to move out o f their line to make 
way for a wildlife area. From the people interviewed, only one person clearly stated that the 
relocation was a welcome move and was glad to go to Vusani. Two others did not like the 
idea o f moving but saw some advantages in mowng. However, these persons did not give 
CAMPFIRE related advantages for the move. Among the reasons given were that children 
would be travelling a shorter distance to school, and the line would be close enough for the 
councillor to come and give details of food assistance. Furthermore, some felt that they 
would be under their chief Mswigana and not Siposo as was the case at the present moment
5 Some of the people in this line came to Lubanji before independence, in 1970, having been 
evicted from Nyamandlovu because that area was a commercial farming area.
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(apparently, a consequence o f administrative aloofness shown by a failure to take into 
account allegiance to chiefs when marking out the ward boundaries).
However, the rest of the respondents expressed negative sentiments abput relocation, and the 
now usual statements, 'you prefer w ild animals to people...' or 'you have m oved us to let 
your w ildlife in ..:' and 'what can we do, who can fig h t the governm ent...' were said' The 
option to remain in Lubanji was given by the officials and the use o f direct force was not 
overtly mentioned. No advantages of continuing to stay in the wildlife area were mentioned. 
However, the disadvantages o f a continued stay in Lubanji were correctly pointed out, that is 
possible increased problem animal incidence. Given the fact that there is no special benefit for 
living with or close to wildlife, the people agreed to move out o f the area to avoid the 
mentioned and implied dangers.
Over the past two years, the people o f Ward 2 (where Lubanji line is) had received revenues 
from wildlife use of $30 and $17 per household. The people o f Lubanji were aware that the 
people o f neighbouring Ward 3 had received household revenues o f $100 each. When we 
asked those in Lubanji line whether they did not feel that their relocation would give their 
ward greater potential for realising higher incomes, they contested the idea. One of the points 
the people raised was that the increased incomes would benefit the ward as a whole,not that 
particular line. 'E ven those who have never seen an elephant w ill also benefit because they 
are members o f the ward. .  . \ said some o f the respondents. This example impinges on the 
empowerment rhetoric associated with CAMPFIRE, but it is a subject beyond the scope of 
this paper. Suffice to say that this demonstrated the unwillingness o f the line to sacrifice on 
behalf of the rest of the ward because they were aware that the benefit from such a sacrifice 
would be equally shared by the whole ward.6
Conclusion
At present the producer community in Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho is defined in terms of 
wards. Consequently, the benefits deriving from the utilisation o f wildlife are shared equally 
among the villages within the ward. However, wards have been criticised as more of an 
administrative convenience than a reflection of social relationships. The above discussion 
then illustrates the need for CAMPFIRE to go further and differentiate beneficiaries in terms 
of the costs they undergo in wildlife management. While the spatial conception of the ward 
may be convenient for other purposes, it does not seem to be entirely useful for identifying 
CAMPFIRE’S "relevant populations" regarding the devolution of revenues. In other words, 
the term community does not imply ward when one is dealing with wildlife issues in 
Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho. It is by a differentiation between producing and non- 
producing villages and lines that those living with the wildlife might readily understand the 
concept of CAMPFIRE and wish to protect their natural resource. Such an effort will be 
successful in establishing a clear link between producer (defined by cost) and benefit.
Having said the foregoing, a caveat needs to be pointed out. One is aware of the problems 
which might be encountered in an attempt to appropriately define the concept of a producer
6 One is tempted to read a relationship between this experience and the problems of co­
operative production in Zimbabwe's model B resettlement schemes.
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community, especially in Tsfiolotsho. For one thing, this means denying those interior villages 
or hoBseMrfst o f  revenues which they are now used to . This might provoke resentment and 
lead to o tter villages or lines taking retaliatory measures to  destroy the resource.
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